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THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES
AND SERVICES
Employment in the Nationalized Industries
BETWEEN 1946 and 1950 the transfer of some of Great Britain's
most important industries to public ownership involved a notable
expansion of government participation in economic life. Loosely
stated, the newly nationalized industries and services identified
in Table 9 may be distinguished from the bulk of government
services by the nature of their functions and the character of
their organization. They differ in function in that they are, for
TABLE 9









British Broadcasting Corporation 11.8
Raw Cotton Commission 0.8
Regional board and teaching hospitalsa 402.5
Totalb . 2,382.6
Total as percentage of the working population. 10.3
a Includes 365,850 full-time and 91,714 part-time staff. Of the latter the
majority, are specialists who hold several positions. Two and one-half part-
time workers are counted as one full unit.
b Excludes the Bank of England, for which employment data were not
available.
the most part, engaged in producing commodities or services of
a type which a large section of opinion traditionally believed
appropriate for production by private enterprise. They differ in
organization in that their assets are owned and their operations
managed by public corporations' enjoying a high degree of free-
dom of action from ministerial or Parliamentary control.
exception is the overseas cable and wireless message facilities, which
were merged with the Post Office.
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To define these differentiating characteristics of the national-
ized industries is not to say that they are without precedent in
Great Britain. Both the central and local governments have long
furnished services and produced goods which either were con-
comitantly produced privately or were of a type which could
easily be entrusted to private enterprise. Municipalized utilities,
ordnance factories, and naval shipyards are obvious examples.
More broadly, there are virtually no functions of government,
with the possible exceptions of justice, defense, and foreign rela-
tions, which were not, when first assumed by the state, widely
deemed to fall properly within the sphere of private industry or
of philanthropic, religious, or groups. All health,
sanitation, and educational activities, for instance, were once con-
sidered to be outside the domain of government.
The use of the public corporation as a form of organization
had also been well explored before World War II. At the local
level there were semi-independent agencies of considerable ex-
perience, like the Metropolitan Water Board (1902), the Port
of London Authority (1908), and the London Passenger Trans-
port Board (1933). At the national level there was the Central
Electricity Board, which had been established in 1926 to promote
and control the bulk generation of electricity and to develop a
nationwide system of main transmission lines. There was• also
the British Broadcasting Corporation, created in 1927, whose
recognized success made its organization a model for the cor-
porations which later were to control the newly nationalized
industries. Just before the war the British Overseas Airways Cor-
poration assumed the ownership of Britain's civil aviation in-
dustry from Imperial Airways.
The nationalization acts of the recent Labour Government
thus do not represent a wholly new departure for the British
state, but rather a huge extension of governmental powers into
unsettled and controversial areas under a form of organization
not unprecedented, but still unfamiliar. By 1950, total employ-
ment in nationalized industries controlled by public corporations
was some 2.4 million, or slightly over 10 per cent of the British
working population (see Table 9). The industries and services
included were coal mining; gas and electricity; inland transport
by rail, road, and water; civil aviation; wireless broadcasting;
the Bank of England; and the medical institutions which became
part of the National Health Service. Early in 1951 all major firms
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of the iron and steel industry passed into public ownership. This
nationalized sector employed close to 250,000 workers who are
not included in the above total. At the present writing, Parlia-
ment, led by a Conservative Government, has acted to return the
iron and steel industry to private hands, but the transfer of
ownership has not yet been completed. By the Transport Act of
1953, the Transport Commission also was required to dispose of
the bulk of its road haulage undertakings.2
The number of persons' working in industries nationalized
since 1945doesnot represent a net addition to public employ-
ment. A considerable portion of the assets acquired by the new
public corporations were obtained from the local authorities to
which they had previously belonged. Measured by output, more
than one-third of the gas suppiy industry and about two-thirds
of electricity supply had been owned by local governments for
years. The greater part of local street transport, the entire Lon-
don Passenger Transport Authority, and a large part of electricity
generation and long-distance transmission had likewise been in
public ownership. The same applies to that major fraction of
the hospitals which were owned by local authorities and then
brought under the National Health Service.
The significance of nationalization is further qualified by the
fact that the privately owned portions of the railroad and utility
industries had been subject to close regulation. In coal and steel,
moreover, government-approved cartels acted in consultation
with govçrnment departments and fixed prices and production
levels.
The degree of public interest and control already asserted be-
fore nationalization, of course, acted to limit the extent to which
nationalization could by itself alter the mode of operation of
these industries. Furthermore, the newly created public
tions were organized so as to ensure them a very large area of
freedom from interference by the state. Unlike the regular gov.
ernment departments, they are not under continuous close super-
vision by Parliament. A Minister may not be questioned about
them except on matters of large public interest. The nationalized
industries do not present their estimates to Parliament, their
2InMarch 1955 it was reported that almost three-fifths of the steel
plants transferred to public ownership by the Labour Government had been
restored to private hands (Reuters, March 3, 1955). The return of road
transport to private hands was largely completed by mid-1955.
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revenues do not pass through the Treasury, their expenditures
are not controlled by that department, nor does that department
take their profits or meet their losses. Public control is exercised
principally by the power of the Ministers to appoint and remove
members of boards and to give them general directions on mat-
ters affecting the national interest. In addition, public corpora-
lions are required. to publish detailed annual reports and ac-
counts, which are submitted to Parliament.
Nationalization has also made little difference to the position
of the work force, which in its formal aspects remains essentially
the same as in private industry. With the single exception of the
personnel of the cable and wireless service, who were transferred
to the Post Office, the employees of the new public corporations
were not assimilated into the government service and did not
acquire civil service status. Wages and working conditions are
determined by collective bargaining between union and corpora-
tion. The right to strike is preserved. Workers in a nationalized
industry do not name any members of the boards of directors.
Almost all these boards do include trade unionists, but only in
their individual capacities. Whether public ownership will, in
the long run, make some substantial difference in the position of
the work force remains to be seen.
Background of the Recent Nationalization Acts
INDIJSTBIES AND BANKING
For this impressive expansion of governmental participation
in the production of goods and services there is a broad basis in
the development of British social and political thought and addi-
tional support from the circumstances of the times and the con-
ditions of the particular industries affected. The acts of nationali-
zation were the work of the Labour Party, which came into
power in 1945. Though its doctrinal position was prominent, the
Party's electoral success and the nation's acceptance of its pro-
gram were founded on a sweep of opinion broader than Labour
doctrine and on circumstantial influences narrower than doctrinal
principle.
Socialist theory characteristically holds that the ccmeans of
production" should be owned in common. This point of principle
has been formally accepted by the British Labour Party at least
since For industries of national scope, this has usually been
BSeeC. D. H. Cole, A H&ory of the Labour Party from 1914, London,
Routledge, 1948, pp. 53-54.
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taken to mean ownership by the state, and, since the Labour
Party and Trades Union Congress of 1985, the Party has viewed.
the public corporation as the proper agency for the state to use
in most cases.4
The Socialist position rests on the broadest grounds: that a
true political democracy is impossible as long as productive
capital is privately owned and wealth unequally distributed, and
that the efficient use of capital for the general welfare demands
public management "for use and not for profit." Public ownership
is viewed also as a device for equalizing wealth and income—an
important objective in its own right. It is held to give the working-
man an interest in the success of his establishment which will
raise his morale and so his productivity. Finally, public owner-
ship is regarded as a way to achieve the rationalization of the
structure of industry, which is taken to be impeded by the splin-
tering of units of ownership.
These arguments had won wide acceptance among Labour
voters from the beginning of the century, but not all Labour sup-
porters were Socialists and the Labour Party itself had never
won a majority of votes in the country or of seats in Parliament
before World War II. Considerations of somewhat narrower and
more particular application help explain the country's acceptance
of the Labour Party and its program of nationalization in 1945.
The economic problem which the public regarded with great-
est concern as the war drew to a close was the maintenance of
full employment. For this purpose it was held that the level of
investment had to be high, and that it had to be susceptible to
management in order to keep it stable and to direct its location
to areas of surplus manpower. The possibilities of achieving these
aims would, it was argued, be enhanced if the area subject to
direct public control were enlarged by the nationalization of
industries accounting for a significant proportion of total invest-
ment. The Labour Party's 1945 program made much of these possi-
bilities, and since there was wide public acceptance of the notion
of state intervention to control the level and location of invest-
ment, it is plausible that these arguments weighed with many
people when they considered the nationalization of particular
industries urged by the Labour Party.5
Austen Albu, "The Organization of Nationalized Industries and Services,"
Problems of Nationalized Industry, W. A. Robson, editor, London, G. Allen,.
1932, pp. 74-76.
The effect of the depression on Labour opinion is well described by
89NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES AND SERVICES
Britain wanted a high level of investment not solely to safe-
guard full employment, but also to raise productivity. The coun-
try's progress had been slow in the inter-war period. There had
been a serious loss of capital abroad during the war, the post-
war balance-of-international-payments problem was threatening,
and the burden of the social welfare program to be undertaken
was heavy. But faith in the country's ability to obtain the benefits
of free enterprise was limited. Though skeptical of the fruits of
nationalization, The Economist wrote: "The visiOn of a com-
pletely untrammelled industry achieving new prodigies of enter-
prise by the method of free competition is nowadays merely a
vision. For one thing, comparatively few British industries are
competitive. The practices of controlling prices and production
and of protecting profit margins have gone so far that a 'market
price' is becoming a rare phenomenon."6 Some weeks later the
same journal added: "In 1939, it was an extreme rarity to find a
manufacturing industry where anything approaching genuine
competition prevailed, where no control was exercised over prices
or the scale of production or the conditions of sale—and such
exceptions as existed before the war will be found to have dis-
appeared at its end."7
Finally, the idea that deliberate measures of industrial reor-
ganization were necessary was widely accepted, not only by labor
groups but also by businessmen. Provided the reorganization
could be managed cooperatively, the latter saw in it a means
to attain both the safety and profits of limited competition and
a more orderly and efficient set of technological arrangements.8
H. A. Clegg and T. E. Chester, The Future of Nationalization, Oxford,
Blackwell, 1953, pp. 11 if. The Socialism of the 1945 program was notably
full-employment-oriented in the opinion of its own supporters. See New
Statesman and Nation, October 14, 1944, p. 248. The need for state control
of investment, although not necessarily by nationalization of industry, was
widely accepted even in non-Socialist circles. Beveridge's FuU Employment
in a Free Society had made a striking impression. The most authoritative
organ of liberal opinion was convinced: "And even if the question of 'im-
perfect competition' never arose, purposive direction by the organs of the
state would be necessary to secure the two objectives of adequate employ-
ment and of a balanced location of industry" (TheEconoml$t,July 22, 1944,
p. 104). The wartime White Paper on Employment Policy accepted the
task as a matter of governmental responsibility (Ministry of Reconstruction,
1944, Cmd. 8527).
6 22, 1944, p. 104.
September 9, 1944, p. 342.
8 See Clegg and Chester, op. cit., pp. 15-17.
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There had already been attempts of varying significance to
achieve better organization, partly by state-tolerated cartels and
mergers, partly by active state intervention of various kinds.
The public utilities—gas, electricity, and rail transport—had, of
course, long been regulated• as to prices, character of service,
right of entry, and other matters. In addition, considerable por-
tions of the gas, electricity, and local street transport industries
were in the hands of local authorities. After World War I the
concentration of electricity generation and the construction of a
national grid had been accomplished under the aegis of a public
body, the Central Electricity Board, established in 1926. Railways
were run by the state as a national system in World War I. When
returned to private ownership in 1921, they were amalgamated
into four companies by authority of an act of Parliament, as an
alternative to nationalization. When Lord Ashfield, the most
powerful figure in London transport, demanded monopoly powers
in order to control and coordinate the activities of independent
motorbus operators in the metropolis, the Labour Party, led by
Herbert Morrison, argued that the monopoly powers should be
granted only to a public board. This was a position which private
interests found difficult to attack. The bill to establish the London
Passenger Transport Board was passed by a Conservative-con-
trolled Parliament in 1933, and Lord Ashfield himself became
Chairman of the Board. Between regulated private monopoly and
public ownership there was a short and easy
Private cartels and mergers in other fields were, as already
stated, common. Their professed aim was rationalization. But
while many industries were thus able to restrict output and raise
prices, shipbuilding and flour milling were the only industries
which by their own efforts were able to achieve even the type
of rationalization implied in eliminating the less efficient portions
of excess capacity. Both operated through private cartels which
financed the retirement of capacity by a levy on the industry.'°
In 1934 the steel industry, with the approval of the government,
set up a powerful cartel, the British Iron and Steel Federation,
which coordinated the activities of a number of existing quota-
and price-fixing associations. In return for promised reorganiza-
ibid., p. 18.
10P.J. D. Wiles, "Pre-War and War-Time Controls," in The British
Economy, 1945-1950, G. D. N. Worswick and P. H. Ady, editors, Oxford,
1952, p. 140.
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tion and capital expansion, the government granted a tariff. The
tariff and the restriction of capacity raised profits, but reorganiza-
tion and development were not impressive.11
Private action was often inadequate to bring the divergent in-
terests of different firms under control. After the depression of
1929-1932, the support of state authority was successfully en-
listed by a few industries. Steel has been mentioned. The Cotton
Industry Reorganization Act (1937) set up a Spindles Board to
buy up and. scrap excess capacity by levies on the spinners. A
1940 act (Cotton Industry Act) established a Cotton Board "to
stimulate research and exports; to collect information; and 'to act
as a negotiating body on any matters affecting the industry."12
More important, the coal industry, which had been operated
but not reorganized, by the government in World War I, was
formed into a statutory cartel in 1930 in the hope that reorganiza-
tion and development plans might be implemented. This produced
district selling schemes which regulated output, but neither the
cartel nor the Coal Mines Reorganization Commission were able,
with their inadequate powers, to overcome the disinclination of
independent,, cartel-protected owners to amalgamate pits or to
invest capital.18 The nationalization of coal royalties carried
through in 1938 could have only a very gradual effect as existing
leases expired.
These measures and the attitudes on which they were based
must have predisposed a large sector of non-Socialist opinion to
accept acts of nationalization. For if monopoly is openly accepted
as necessary for the proper organization, operation, and develop-
ment of an industry, many persons would accept the need for
the most intimate and extensive state regulation. It is then more
difficult to oppose public ownership as one means by which
that regulation can be made effective.
These considerations applied with exceptional force to the
major industries actually proposed for nationalization—coal,
transport, gas, electricity, and steel. They are "basic" industries
and so appealed to Socialists as the areas in which the principle
of common ownership of the means of production should first be
applied. They account for a substantial proportion of total invest-
11 Ibid. See also Clegg and Chester, op.cit., p. 38.
12 Worswick and Ady, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
18 Ibid., p. 131, and Ben W. Lewis, British Planning and Nationalization,
Twentieth Century Fund, 1952, pp. 55-56.
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ment; hence the task of keeping investment expenditure high and
stable might be facilitated by nationalization. The transport, gas,
and electricity industries, moreover, are the commonest examples
of public utilities. That they are clothed with the public interest
had been accepted for decades, and intimate regulation and
local public ownership of substantial portions of them already
were in effect. Parts of electricity generation and long-distance
distribution were already nationalized.
All the industries included in the Labour Government program
were monopolies by cartel, by merger, or by franchise. There was,
indeed, inter-industry competition between rail and road trans-
port and between gas and electricity. But this rivalry was taken
to be only a minor limitation upon market power and, at the same
time, an obstacle to the rational expansion of the industries af-
fected. Public regulation therefore was viewed as inevitable, and
it had already gone far.
Finally, all the industries were held to require radical improve-
ment in organization, capital equipment, or both. Private or local
monopolies, subject to such state authority as had been estab-
lished before the war, had manifestly proven inadequate. The
coal pits still required extensive and equipment.
The railroads, fast losing traffic to trucks, were failing to improve
or even adequately to maintain their equipment for necessary
services. Local electricity distribution companies required ama!-
gamation into area schemes to permit standardization of current
systems, voltages, and methods of charge; to expand distribution,
especially to rural areas; and to obtain more efficient load factors
by combining the varying use patterns of different localities. The
capital equipment of all the industries on the nationalization list
required improvement and enlargement, and government assist-
ance would, it was argued, be required to obtain the capital. In
all cases but steel, these needs were defined and certified by a
series of public inquiries. In the case of steel the industry pro-
duced its own plan for capital expansion with government assIst-
ance.14
Public opinion with regard to three of the industries was so
in accord that The Economist could write before the 1945 elec-
lions: "...on the further issue of economic policy, the most that
a Labour Government could be expected to do would be to
change the formal ownership of the mining, transport and power
14Cf.Clegg andChester,op. cit., pp. 20-40.
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industries, while a Tory Government will certainly have to con-
cern itself with the same industries, and might well be compelled
by events to be almost equally drastic in its intervention in their
policies, even though it left the formal façade of ownership Un-
tohave been only in part a
reflection of the spread of Socialist convictions in Britain. In
part it must be attributed to the existence of peculiarly difficult
problems in a few industries, in part to an attempt to facilitate
general employment policy, and in good part to the weakness of
private enterprise. The principle, as distinct from the form, of
nationalization was accepted with surprisingly little controversy
in all the large industries just discussed except steel.
In other industries there was also little dispute. The Bank
of England had been effectively a government organ for many
decades. It was brought under state ownership partly to satisfy
Socialist principle and partly to clothe it with formal powers to
direct the money market. Civil, aviation had been nationalized in
1940, when the government took over the monopoly previously
granted to Imperial Airways. The industryhad been early organ-
ized as a monopoly with state subsidy for military reasons, to
serve the interests of foreign policy, and because a large scale of
operation was thought necessary. It was put under government
ownership to permit greater concentration upon national
tives. The Nationalization Act of 1945 merely reorganized the
British Overseas Airways Corporation into several area units.
Finally, overseas wireless and radio were acquired and placed
in the Post Office with the telephone and telegraph services,
which the government had taken over many years earlier.'6
THE HEALTH SERVICE
In addition to passing the acts of nationalization in industrial
and commercial fields, the recent Labour Government assumed
responsibility for virtually all medical care in Great Britain. This
development is again an expression of Socialist principle and the
culmination of a long history of expansion in state provision of
preventative and curative health services.
In no other field, except perhaps education, does the principle
of equal treatment or of provision according to need make such a
15May26, 1945, p. 686. 16Seeabove, Chapter 8.
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strong appeal. "IftheSocialistic principle of the equal treatment
of equal needs is to be applied anywhere, medicine is clearly one
of the first fields in which it ought to be introduced. In many
fields we can fairly salve our consciences, at any rate for the time
being, by applying the principle of the 'national minimum' be-
low which no one is to be allowed to fall; we can tolerate large
differences above the mmimum.... Butin the case of medicine
the minimum is bound to approximate to the standard."7
The assumption of some degree of governmental responsibility
for public and individual health long preceded the conscious
formulation of modern Socialist doctrine and won acceptance
far beyond Socialist or Labour circles. In Chapters 4 and 5 we
have already traced some of the major steps taken by the central
and local governments since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, first to provide the proper environmental conditions at
home and at work and then to furnish facilities for individual
care, particularly through general, tuberculosis, and mental
hospitals. In addition, since 1911 the health insurance scheme
has provided free medical treatment and sick pay for workers.
Nevertheless, serious deficiencies in facilities for health care
were still deemed to exist in the 1930's, and these led to a wide-
spread demand for a comprehensive health service to be instituted
after the end of the Second World War. The elaborate survey
made by Political and Economic Planning in 1937 seemed to bear
out three contentions: the standard of health was still low, the
incidence of ill health was more general and more serious in the
lower income groups, and the existing health services were inade-
quate. Insurance, for example, covered workers but not their
families. A great quantity of disease remained uncared for, even
unsuspected. Hospitals were too small, generally below an ac-
ceptable standard, and poorly distributed, and other aspects of
health care were poorly organized.18
The existence of this mass of ill health was, by the early 1940's,
regarded not only as an affliction for the individuals involved,
but also as a burden on the productivity of the nation and a
serious complication for another task which the government was
exploring, the creation of a comprehensive social insurance plan.
17 New Statesman and Nation, March 30, 1948, p. 224.Seealso R. A.
Brady, Cr1313 In Britain, University of California Press, 1950, p. 354.
'8See the summary of the PEP and other relevant reports in Brady, op.
cit., pp. 355-367.
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Sir William Beveridge formulated his scheme for social insurance
upon the assumption that there would be a comprehensive na-
tional health service providing every citizen "whatever medical
treatment he requires, in whatever form he requires it,. domiciliary
or institutional, general, specialist or consultant, and to ensure
also the provision of dental, ophthalmic and surgical appliances,
nursing and midwifery and rehabilitation after accidents."19
That Beveridge was able to base his insurance scheme upon
so radical an assumption is a reflection of the development of
public opinion. The British Medical Association had itself pro-
posed a radical extension of health insurance in 1930. The Asso-
ciation put forward a revised scheme in 1938, which, it is esti-
mated, would have entitled at least 90 per cent of. the population
to free medical care. The Conservative Party, in a Coalition
Government White Paper of 1944, accepted, in the words of a
spokesman, "the principle of a national, comprehensive, 100
per cent health service."20 When the Labour Government pro-
posed its plan for a national health service, controversy centered,
therefore, not on the general principle, but on such matters as the
status of physicians as fee-paid contractors of the service, rather
than as civil servants; the degree of professional influence in ad-
ministration; the role of local governments in the management
of hospitals; and the preservation of foundation assets in the case
of voluntary hospitals taken over by the state.
The National Health Service Act fell into three main parts.
First, the hospitals, both voluntary and local authority, were
taken over by the Ministry of Health to be administered by
regional hospital boards. Second, for purposes of medical care
outside hospitals, the services of doctors, dentists, oculists and
opticians, and pharmacists were contracted for on fee bases
peculiar to each of these services. These professional services are
administered by executive councils, one for each branch of the
service. Third, the local authoritIes were required to provide
and maintain a system of health centers to the satisfaction of the
Minister of Health. All these services were made completely free
to every member of the population choosing to use them,21 and
free choice of physicians was an integral feature of the plan.
19W.H. Beveridge, Social Insurance and the Allied Services, Macmifian,
1942, p. 158.
20Brady,op. cit., pp. 368-369.
21Certaincharges for eye glasses and dentures were later instituted.
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For the purpose of the present discussion, it should be pointed
out that only the section relating to hospitals represents a clear
act of nationalization. The buildings and equipment of these
institutions became the property of the nation, and their full-time
staffs became employees of a national service providing hospital
care. Doctors and dentists, however, are generally private con-
tractors. They are remunerated by the state for any patients
whom they accept under the provisions of the Health Service
Act, but they meet their own costs and their income depends
primarily on the number of patients they can attract. They re-
serve whatever portion of their time they please for private prac-
tice. The health centers, though subject to central supervision,
remain a local government responsibility. These considerations
led us to enter in Table 9 only the staff of the regional board
hospitals as employees of nationalized industries and services.
Since most practitioners, however, have no real alternative to
devoting the bulk of their time to the care of clients of the Health
Service, and since, with respect to such clients, their fees are
fixed and many of their activities are regulated, one may ques-
tion whether the difference between their position and that of
state employees is fundamental.
The National Health Service today cares for almost the entire
population, and almost all members of the professional groups
involved are participants.22 While there may be changes in its
form from time to time, there can be little doubt that the basic
elements of the service will be retained by future British gov-
ernments.
22 In 1950 between 90 and 95 per cent of all general practitioners, over
90 per cent of all dentists, and almost all pharmacists were participating.
Approximately 95 per cent of the population was using the service (Health
Services in Britain, British Information Services, T.D. 753, December 1951).
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